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La globalización, entendida como aumento de interconectividad e 
interdependencia entre países, es presentada como una de las 
características principales del período que se inicia a principio de los 
años ’90. El flujo comercial, la circulación de capital, de objetos, de 
ideas, así como también el desplazamiento de personas constituyen 
la dimensión material de este fenómeno que representa un impor-
tante desafío para el derecho laboral
El estudio que aquí presentamos se centra principalmente en el 
estudio de leyes, decretos de aplicación, debates parlamentarios y 
documentos de la OIT; así como también en datos secundarios 
producidos por organismos internacionales y nacionales. Igualmente, 
una parte de este amplio proceso de producción de regulación es 
reconstruido a partir de literatura especializada; particularmente, en 
el caso de la literatura jurídica.
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The ‘Third wave of democraTizaTion’ coincided with a ‘sec-
ond wave’ of economic liberalism. The story of the democracy ‘waves’ 
— as detailed by huntington1 — shows the first one surging from the 
american suffrage extensions of the early nineteenth century and 
ebbing with the advent of fascism in europe in the 1920s. allied vic-
tory led to a second, twenty-year-long wave, which includes india (the 
one ‘second wave’ democracy case in this study). moreover, a third 
wave took momentum after Portugal’s ‘carnation revolution’ of 1974, 
extending to countries in Latin america, asia, eastern europe and 
finally africa, up to the mid-1990s. This story accounts for the fact 
that, starting somewhere in the mid-1970s, political conditions gradu-
ally changed or shifted in many parts of the world in favor of some 
form of political liberalization, mostly taking the shape of a revival of 
representative democracy. in the South —particularly in asia, Latin 
america and africa— this was to a decisive extent the result of the 
fact that authoritarian models of state-led development were failing 
on many scores. where the economic engine of the model performed 
more satisfactorily, the authoritarian nature of state leadership cre-
1 huntington (The Third Wave, 1991).
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ated serious problems.2 in the more numerous cases where economic 
performance was dismal, the political oppressions of authoritarian-
ism added to economic misery. whichever the case, increasing num-
bers of people saw authoritarianism, or more specifically, the lack of 
political participation, as the root cause of the problem. a democratic 
reform of the state appeared to be the solution in places as different as 
Bolivia and niger — two of the three cases studied in this paper.
at roughly the same time, as noted above, a wave of liberal eco-
nomic reforms trickled out of institutions in washington dc in the 
late 1970s, quickly gathering sufficient thrust to sweep through most 
of the countries in the South by the mid-1990s. historically, an earlier 
age of liberalism had ruled the economy in many countries from the 
mid-1850s to the Great depression,3 and the newer one was accord-
ingly named ‘neoliberalism’. The proponents of this neoliberal reform, 
too, diagnosed that there was a fatal problem with the authoritarian 
model of state-led development that was then hegemonic in the South. 
however, while advocates of democratic reform targeted the authori-
tarian part of the proposition, neoliberal reforms focused instead on 
its state-led segment.  
it therefore so happened that, by the early 1980s, two reform agen-
das emerged in the South: one, which was broadly based on domestic 
movements and sought a democratic reform of the state, demanding 
the end of authoritarianism together with increased political partici-
pation in the ‘state system’ (this concept is explained further below); 
and the other, which largely came from the outside and pushed for a 
neoliberal reform of the state, insisting on an end of its stewardship of 
development and on free rein for ‘market forces’.
Therefore, while the target was the same —the state— in both 
reform agendas their objectives were very different and even, to some 
significant extent, incompatible. They were, at any rate, in competi-
tion, and the success of the one would scuttle the progress of the oth-
er.4 democratic and neoliberal reforms did not —and still do not— 
2 The best case in point is perhaps that of South Korea, an economic ‘miracle’ un-
der the dictatorship of Park chung-hee, but also a political impasse, leading to the 
massive instability of the late 1970s that included the assassination of Park (1979) 
and the Gwangju massacre (1980) and its fractious aftermath. only democratic re-
form ultimately gave the country a way out many years later. 
3 among the cases studied in this paper, Bolivia is a poster child of the first age of 
economic liberalism. it embraced the policy early on, under the presidency of Linares 
(1857-1861) and became one of its major victims following the Great depression. 
4 of course, the mainstream literature in political science holds the exact opposite 
to be true. during the heyday of the ‘Third wave’, well-respected authors diamond, 
Linz and Lipset writing on the countries of the Global South, thus claimed that ‘all 
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have compatible goals regarding the role of the state. The empirical 
record shows that the two reform agendas were not originally pro-
moted by the same actors, nor did they rest on the same vision of the 
role of the state, much to the contrary. for the democracy promoters, 
key implications include the winding down of the state’s repressive 
capacities and the preservation of its ‘developmental’ ones — mean-
ing that the state was to remain a political engine capable of trans-
forming the structure of the economy through direct involvement of 
its specific powers. for the promoters of neoliberalism, on the other 
hand, the imperative was for the state to create the conditions for 
market expansion, a mission which may well entail an overhaul of 
its repressive apparatus, at least at some early stage. To better clarify 
the significance of these and related implications, a brief theoretical 
analysis is in order. 
here, i draw especially on aspects of neo-marxist perspectives on 
the state as developed by ralph milliband in The State in Capitalist 
Society (2009 [1969]) as well as on the brief synthesis later provided 
by robert Solo in the Journal of Economic Issues.5 i am principally 
interested in their view of the state as a system of power made of sev-
eral ‘functional elements’ that are operated firstly to create —through 
a degree of autonomy— a state of equilibrium among social classes, 
but ultimately to further the overarching interests of the dominant 
class(es). in the case of milliband, such functional elements in-
clude government, but also ‘the civil service, the complex of public 
agencies, the military, the judiciary, and the police’ (summarized by 
Solo6). Such a concept of the state as a system of power has —for 
my purposes— at least two important dimensions: first, it prevents 
us from understanding state power as limited to itself and situated 
above all other forms of power intervening in the polity; and second, 
and more importantly, it is also helpful in evaluating the magnitude 
of state power, and the fine grain of the changes that can be made to 
increase or decrease that magnitude in relation to a set of objectives 
—such as happened in the interlocking courses of democratic and 
neoliberal reforms in the Global South. 
democracies […] are to some degree capitalist; production and distribution of goods 
are determined mainly by competition in the market, rather than by the state, and 
there is significant private ownership of the means of production’ (diamond et al. 
1989: xxi). over thirty years later, the same pronouncement was repeated unblink-
ingly by T. Leon: ‘all liberal democracies are also market-oriented economies’ (‘The 
State of Liberal democracy in africa’, 2010).  
5 See milliband (2009 [1969]) and Solo (‘The neo-marxist Theory of the State’, 
1978).
6 Solo (1978: 832).
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combined with a comparative synopsis of two major experiences 
of democratic reform in Bolivia — the national revolution of 1952 
and the current, movimiento al Socialismo (maS) attempt — this un-
derstanding of neo-marxist theories of the state will be used to de-
velop a conceptual framework on state reform agendas. The key ele-
ments of the framework will then be applied to an analysis of two case 
studies from niger and the indian states of west Bengal and Gujarat. 
So the comparison is chiefly between niger and india, with Bolivia 
supplying only an exemplary story for building the theoretical fodder 
used in the case studies.
13
A word on compArIson 
why niGer and india? why compare two countries that are so 
patently different? The empirical challenge for this study was to find 
cases from the South that are different in terms of continental loca-
tion, yet similar in terms of political system and reform policy. The 
difference of continental location is a proxy for the more substantial 
— as far as the objectives of the study are concerned — difference of 
historical process and its implications for our times, which is why the 
South-South research consortium, that has funded this project, has 
suggested that authors should compare cases across, rather than with-
in the three southern continents. on the other hand, the significance 
of my study derives also from a comparison between democratic and 
neoliberal reform. This means that the selected cases should have both 
undergone such reforms in one way or another. not many countries 
in asia correspond to this description: either countries have known 
democratic but no neoliberal reform (South Korea, Taiwan), or they 
have known neither democratic, nor neoliberal reform (most of South 
asia). india was the only clear case in the circumstance, but its pro-
cesses being of a complexity that evidently defies the parameters of a 
comparison with niger, i have found more useful to break them down 
into an internal comparative case study focusing on west Bengal and 
Gujarat. niger was chosen precisely for the apparent simplicity and 
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linearity of its trajectory, which make for an economical examination 
of the issues at hand.
This being said, a comparison between these three places obvi-
ously begs some questions that need addressing. The differences in 
the historical processes leading to the emergence of Bolivia, niger and 
india as countries, as well as the distinctive current standing of each 
of these countries in the international political economy, makes of 
comparison a difficult proposition. more specifically, we can ask two 
sets of questions: are we justified in comparing countries that are very 
different from each other, or should we restrict comparison only to 
places that share most essential parameters in common? and can we 
compare experiences across continents, or is it best to stay within the 
confines of one specific geographic area?1 The response to these ques-
tions depends on the purpose of our comparison. it might rankle with 
some that niger could be compared with india for instance — or even 
with west Bengal — given the many fundamental disparities between 
the two countries. however, i believe it is legitimate and very useful 
to compare across vastly different countries when the comparison is 
about a particular phenomenon, rather than about the full political 
or economic frameworks of the countries involved. in this particular 
case, the comparison is less about niger and india than about the dif-
ferent shapes that neoliberalism can take in different places while re-
taining its most recognizable features. in that sense, in fact, the great-
er the difference between cases, the more conclusive the results — if 
indeed they show that the phenomenon leads to similar outcomes, 
despite wide disparities. To make the most of this, we must be able to 
observe in which ways each country’s context affects both the process 
and the outcomes of — in this case — neoliberalism and its interac-
tions with democratic reform. 
Geography, in comparative analyses, is often a proxy for culture 
and history insofar as countries belonging to the same geographic en-
semble habitually share much in common in term of historical and 
cultural experiences. here, i would argue that such similarities are a 
source of a generally unrecognized bias, in that the easy reliance on 
a reference area may serve as a check on analytical insightfulness. 
often, the fact that two countries are ‘african’, or ‘Latin american’, is 
1 a third set of comparisons of countries would relate to time: should cases com-
pared be synchronic (existing in the same age of history) or can they be compared 
in a diachronic way —such as comparing eighteenth century Britain with twentieth 
century nigeria, e.g. This type of comparison seems to be done only with different 
stages in one country’s history. in this essay, the comparison between Bolivia in 




enough to draw certain conclusions in a comparison made between 
them, which perhaps a closer inspection would not have warranted. 
Thus, among political scientists, concepts such as ‘neo- patrimonial-
ism’ function as a shortcut description of politics in Sub-Saharan af-
rican and can be used indiscriminately for countries across the conti-
nent, despite the strikingly different trajectories that these countries 
might follow at certain points in time.2 comparing across areas, and 
more generally, declining to consider that areas are the main units of 
analysis in comparative studies, is useful in switching off this kind of 
preconception and discovering new perspectives and vantage points.
Therefore, there are good reasons for, and notable benefits to be 
derived from comparing cases despite substantial differences and 
across the geographic areas in which they are traditionally embedded. 
This will work well, however, only if we are aware that the comparison 
is trickier and has greater limitations to it than comparisons between 
more similar units. in the essay, i therefore remind at several stages 
the reader that the selected cases generally belong in different spheres 
of the international political economy and have very different degrees 
of economic development and types of political organization. one big 
thing that they all have in common, though, is that they are all three 
countries of the ‘South’, a term, or rather a concept, which comes with 
a key exegetic value. Let us parse this in some detail, to better estab-
lish the bases for comparing the three case countries.
The political process through which most countries in the South 
were born belongs in the single historical event of western european 
global imperialism. neither Bolivia, nor india and niger would exist 
without that centuries-long event. Just as neoliberalism today, impe-
rialism was at the same time different depending on the context and 
times, and essentially recognizable as a specific phenomenon of po-
litical subjugation and economic exploitation. imperialism in South 
america was older than in South asia, which, in turn, was older than 
in Sub-Saharan africa. among the three cases, Bolivia was a colony 
for nearly three centuries (1538-1825) but became an independent 
state before niger was colonized. india was a colony for about two 
2 Thus, in the 1980s, zaïre (now the democratic republic of congo) was ruled by 
the self-cannibalizing regime of marshall mobutu Sese Seko while Burkina faso 
(having shed the name Upper volta) was run by the austere revolutionary regime of 
captain Thomas Sankara. Theories of african neo-patrimonialism could not have 
predicted such divergence, which was imbued with a deep ironic historical signifi-
cance when the Burkinabe rose in october 2014 partly to avenge the assassina-
tion of investigative journalist norbert zongo, the man who wanted to prevent the 
‘mobutuisation’ of Burkina faso at the hands of the counter-revolutionary Blaise 
compaoré regime. 
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centuries (from the second half of the eighteenth century to 1947), 
and niger, for only six decades (1899-1960). Unlike india and niger, 
Bolivia was a settler colony, but it also used to be the only South amer-
ican colony in which the native population (the Quechua and the ay-
mara) remained the majority population (88%), making it somewhat 
similar to situations found outside of South america.3
Pre-colonial history in our three cases was very different. By the 
time the Spanish appeared in its area, Bolivia (its andean portions at 
any rate) was at the center of the large imperial construction of the 
incas of cuzco, an efficiently run polity based on a political economy 
where kinship, labor and reciprocity were the highest values. This 
state and the complex multi-ethnic civilization it supported were de-
stroyed by the Spanish conquerors, save for a number of organizing 
principles that were found useful in terms of exploiting the conquered 
population. in the course of three centuries, Bolivia was crafted as a 
state made for the Spanish settlers — who provided its ruling class 
— while other people were lumped together into a variety of inferior 
groups, with the native population in particular being starkly deprived 
of social and political rights. while Bolivia became an independent 
state in 1825 — following a war with Spain — it is not until the ear-
ly 1950s that its colonial ‘social contract’ would start to unravel, at 
roughly the same period as india and niger. 
The region that became india was for millennia home to brilliant 
imperial civilizations, which eventually developed an advanced pre-
modern economy and sophisticated urban cultures on the back of a 
political system in which rigid social hierarchy and unequal access 
to resources were the norm. The sub-continent radiated cultural and 
commercial influence in the world around it at great distance and the 
effects of its wealth were felt in the economies of europe long before 
some european states (Portugal, france and england) could compete 
for its subjugation. in the eighteenth century, its major states — in-
cluding the then crumbling mughal empire — fell prey to a militarized 
english trading corporation, the east india company, which went on 
to tailor its economy to its needs, destroying most of its homegrown 
springs in the process. after a failed rebellion in 1857 (the ‘indian mu-
tiny’ as it is known in British historiography), the sub-continent came 
under the control of the British state. however, india’s subjugation 
was different from the one inflicted on Bolivia’s native population. To 
run the colony, the British set up schools and universities (the one in 
Kolkata, west Bengal, opened doors in 1857, just before the rebellion) 
3 not in india and niger, where there were no significant settler populations, but 
certainly close to the makeup of South africa. 
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that trained tens of thousands of indian men (and very few women) 
for professional positions in mid-level administration and the law. in 
this way, the budding modern state of india took more indian colors 
by the late colonial era, even though the ruling elite remained conspic-
uously British — with some local potentates still lording it over in the 
so-called ‘princely states’. over the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, the schools and universities also produced a class of modern-
ist, english-speaking indians who would go on to develop the ideals 
of indian nationalism — among them, the Gujarat-born mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi. india’s colonial economy was organized to pri-
marily benefit British business,4 but this did not prevent the Gujarat 
Parsi entrepreneur Jamsetji Tata (1839-1904) from founding, starting 
in 1877, an industrial empire based on textiles — in winning competi-
tion with imports from Britain — and steelmaking. nine decades after 
the 1857 rebellion, india became an independent state, emerging from 
the colonial era as a poor country — when it had been one of the great-
est economies5 of the world right into the early eighteenth century. 
Unlike Bolivia and india, the area that became niger was at the 
margin of the centers of civilization in its region. This arid fringe of 
the prosperous alluvial plains of west africa — manden and hausa-
land, both hugging the river from which niger later took its name 
— was therefore a sparsely inhabited land of small villages and no-
madic communities, serving mostly as a passage corridor for the 
trade routes that linked its neighbors with north africa and the mid-
dle east. as a result, it was seized by the french at the tail end of 
the nineteenth century as an afterthought6 and for many years did 
not find any revenue-generating role in the global economic system 
of french imperialism. in the 1930s, the development of groundnut 
farming integrated niger into the colonial trade economy (économie 
de traite) and led to an evolution reminiscent of what the British had 
accomplished in india: the creation of a modernist, french-speaking 
class of mid-level administrators, teachers and lawyers under a tiny 
ruling club of european civil servants and military whose mission it 
was to stimulate profit-making for french business while ensuring 
4 See maddison (The World Economy, 2006a: 118). 
5 at the time of the mercantile takeover of the east india company, the economy in 
india was undergoing a period of depression triggered by the political instability that 
came with the decline of the mughal empire. This cycle was aggravated, not allevi-
ated, by the depredations of the eic.  
6 niger was a meagre consolation prize which the french arranged to occupy, with 
some concessions from the British, after giving up the eastern Sudan in 1898 (inci-
dent of fashoda). 
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law and order (i.e., political stability) in the land. Just as in india, 
native entrepreneurs emerged — in the region of maradi, niger’s ap-
proximation of Gujarat7 — who built fortunes with local bases, but 
the economy of niger was not transformed by colonization and the 
country emerged from the period as poor — and perhaps slightly 
poorer — than it had gone into it.
So Bolivia, niger and india went through the same historical mo-
ment which birthed the global South. That is, they were integrated 
into the international political economy in ways that led them to 
emerge, in the mid-twentieth century, as under-developed (or Third 
world) countries, with a range of problems that were characteristic of 
such countries and that differentiated them from countries in the de-
veloped world. This is the main basis on which we can compare these 
countries. however, before we can draw any viable conclusion from 
this point, it is worth our while to consider some political-economic 
features of the three countries in more recent times.
These data obviously do not tell the whole story, especially when it 
comes to the case of india, a federation of states in which some of the 
federated states are much wealthier than Bolivia while others resem-
ble niger. however, the general point of the matter is that, despite a 
vastly more powerful economy, india belongs in the same area of the 
international political economy as Bolivia and niger, and, on this ac-
count, could be fruitfully compared to them. all three countries are 
lower income countries with a large traditional economy (primary 
7 See Grégoire (The Alhazai of Maradi, 1992). 
Parameters Bolivia India Niger
Population 10.8 million 1.267 million 18.5 million
GDP 34.1 billion USD 2 trillion USD 8.1 billion USD
GNI per capita 2,830 USD 1,610 USD 430 USD
HDI 0.667 (rank 113) 0.586 (rank 135) 0.337 (rank 187)
Classification Lower Middle Income Lower Middle Income Low Income
Primary 46% workforce 57.6% workforce 85.9% workforce
Secondary 20% workforce 18.2% workforce 2.4% workforce
Tertiary 34% workforce 25.2% workforce 11.7% workforce
Democracy since 1982 1947 1991
Source: data compiled from the World Bank (Pop., GDP, GNI/cap, and Classification); Expansión Datosmacro (HDI), and various other 
sources. The data for the workforce structure for Niger dates from 2002, while those for Bolivia and India are more recent.
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sector and the informal economy)8 and they all rank, in terms of hu-
man development, in the bottom ninety — niger being generally last 
on the UndP index. comparison makes sense when it is possible to 
add to comparable parameters the significant variation that may help 
us to explain different outcomes. So if our three countries have some 
key political-economic traits in common, they diverge on many other 
key points, including population and GdP. in general, the challenges 
to which they must respond are of different orders: niger, as we shall 
see, is in a position where it needs to extract or secure development 
capital in very taxing conditions, while, on the whole, the main is-
sue in india is productive investment and income redistribution. Bo-
livia’s situation lies halfway between niger’s predicament and india’s 
concerns. for both Bolivia and niger, democratic reform is a fairly 
recent event which has initially meant the adoption of a western-style 
representative democratic regime founded on liberal values, a system 
which india had maintained since independence in the late 1940s.
This is the general background of the comparative case made in 
this essay about the interaction between democratic and neoliberal 
reform. i now turn to an analysis of Bolivian issues as a way to build 
a conceptual framework. 
8 This is in terms of employment, not contribution to GdP. in india for instance, 
while the primary sector is the first employer of the population, the service sector 




towArd A conceptuAl FrAmework
in 2006, BoLivianS STarTed, under President morales, a radi-
cal democratic reform of their politics. a new constitution adopt-
ed in 2009 reinvented the country as a ‘plurinational state’1 To this 
ostensibly ‘post-liberal-democracy’2 evolution, maS appended an 
ambitious national development Plan grounded in the uplifting 
principles of dignity, Sovereignty, Productivity, and a democracy of 
Living well. The constitution and the plan organize a full political 
and economic framework with which to reform the Bolivian state in 
the name of democracy, and against the neoliberal reform that had 
been in force since the early 1980s. vice-President García Linera 
provided — and continues to provide — sophisticated and influen-
tial analyses of the process, while on may 1st, 2011, morales signed a 
presidential decree intended to ‘bury’ the one from 1985 which had 
launched neoliberal reform.
1 This is glowingly described by albro as ‘for now the culmination of a long process 
[…] to shape the postcolonial terms of political participation, which has been histori-
cally defined by the profound marginalization of its indigenous and popular major-
ity.’ Quoted from ‘confounding cultural citizenship and constitutional reform in 
Bolivia’ (2010: 71). 
2 See wolf (‘Towards Post-Liberal democracy in Latin america?’, 2013).
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although these moves and measures ostensibly intend to over-
turn the neoliberal reform of the state of the past three decades, 
many serious analyses suggest that they have in fact simply ‘recon-
stituted’ (in the words of Jeffery webber) the neoliberal state. The 
brief version of the story could run thus:  by the late 1990s-early 
2000s, the failure of neoliberalism to solve Bolivia social and eco-
nomic predicament had become so endemic that the country was 
once more in a state of prolonged crisis. especially the privatization 
of hydrocarbons had shorn the state of revenue, and in the early 
2000s, it found itself unable to stave off the calamitous consequenc-
es of — among other things — coca eradication and the argentine 
economic collapse (Kohl and farthing, 2009). escalating crises 
and social conflicts destroyed the presidency of Sánchez de Lozada 
and led to a referendum on the nationalization of hydrocarbons in 
July 2004. The referendum sought (in the words of President car-
los mesa) a ‘relegitimization’3 of the state through reviving some of 
the policy orientations that obtained before neoliberalism. however, 
only maS garnered the political power base needed to implement its 
key outcome, the nationalization of hydrocarbons. yet, after this was 
done, the constraints created by the preceding neoliberal politico-
economic regime effectively led maS to conduct what Kaup terms 
a ‘neoliberal nationalization’: ‘while it technically returned physi-
cal control of Bolivia’s natural gas to the state, the space opened 
up for private investment in the hydrocarbon sector in the 1980s 
and 1990s still exists. Transnational firms still extract the majority 
of Bolivia’s natural gas, and most of it is still sent to more profitable 
export markets’4[i.e., instead of funding the industrialization agenda 
the referendum propounded]. 
as has been pointed out by various critics, this turn of events 
seems to characterize maS efforts generally at democratic reform. 
James Petras thus stresses that maS has consistently stuck to large-
ly orthodox economic policies. Social spending, public investment, 
pay raises for public sector workers remain all at very modest levels, 
while banks and businesses have been benefiting from the cuddling 
of low taxes, stable currency and government blandishments — up to 
and including resisting strikes and labor pressures. The government 
holds on foreign reserves earned through the export of boom-time 
commodities and increased royalties, a policy that better serves the 
3 ‘after the referendum’, mesa had told the daily La Nación, ‘the state has recovered 
an important degree of legitimacy’. Quoted in The Free Library / South American Po-
litical and Economic Affairs - NotiSud (2004), an online resource.
4 Kaup (‘a neoliberal nationalization?’, 2010: 135). 
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purpose of luring foreign investors with the possibility of accessing 
hard currencies than that of investing in the internal economy. in the 
same vein, infrastructure spending has been chiefly aimed at facilitat-
ing transport of agro-mineral exports, a constant of Bolivia’s various 
historical eras of liberal ascendancy. a similar orthodoxy-abidance is 
clearly noticeable in maS’ investment and labor policies, to the ex-
tent that, as a conclusion to his indictment, Petras labeled morales a 
‘radical conservative’,5 i.e., someone who cloaks conservative policies 
with radical affirmations. if using a more moderate language, similar 
criticism has been leveled by various authors (cunha filio; Gonçalves 
and dalla déa, 2010; regalsky and ortega Breña, 2010; webber, 2011), 
with webber mounting a solid case of morales’ governance as ‘recon-
stituted neoliberalism’.
maybe such assessments are too severe. Given maS’ undeniable 
thrust toward democratic reform, they may simply reveal that this 
agenda is being stemmed by the sturdier legacies of neoliberalism. it 
is useful, in this light, to contrast maS’ relative failures (for now) to 
the outcome of Bolivia’s first effort at democratic reform, the national 
revolution of 1952, which did succeed in transforming Bolivia’s soci-
ety while creating a new state, famously known as the Estado del 52 
(the state of ‘52).6 a brief comparison between democratic reform 
then and now may begin to put us on the track of understanding the 
nature of the limitations of maS’ attempt at offering to present-day 
Bolivians the fresh start they received from the Estado del 52.
The events leading up to the arrival of maS and of the mov-
imiento nacionalista revolucionario (mnr) to power respectively 
in 2004 and in 1952 were both marked by a structural crisis of the 
economy and violent conflict at the societal level. in particular, the 
novelty in 1952 was the rapid politicization of labor (workers and 
peasants) as a result of the collapse of elite order, after the Great de-
pression destabilized tin capitalism, and the chaco war debilitated 
the military. in a clear sense, it was oligarchy (the tin barons and 
the so-called rosca state that served them) and autocracy (military 
leaders) giving way, for the first time in Bolivia’s already long in-
dependent history, to democracy (workers, peasants and nationalist 
leaders). from an analytical point of view, what happened was the 
5 Petras (‘The most radical conservative regime’, 2013).  
6 ‘it was a state of vast reach’, write arze and Kruse, ‘playing a central role not only 
in capital formation and allocation but also employment. it was a provider of services 
and the focus of social demands, making itself present as never before in people’s 
daily lives and the agendas of social struggle’ (‘The consequences of neoliberal re-
form’, 2004: 24). 
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convergence of a certain kind of political will from the top —that 
is, within the mnr leadership— and of a certain kind of popular 
agency from below, agreeing on a political program of democratic re-
form (universal vote, nationalization of mines and agrarian reform) 
and using certain transformative institutions (the corporación min-
era de Bolivia, comiBoL; the ministerio de asuntos campesinos 
and the central obrera Boliviana, coB) to execute the program. 
These institutions were meeting-ground organizations, in the sense 
that they created a space of close collaboration between state agents 
and labor representatives.7 all four elements —political will, popular 
agency, agreed-upon reform program and meeting-ground institu-
tions— had been necessary and sufficient to the initial success of the 
revolution, that is, the reform of the state so that it became capable 
of large-scale nationalization of mines, wide-ranging land distribu-
tion and more generally, an efficient stewardship of the welfare of 
the larger population.8 This process in turn put an end to the cycle of 
Bolivian history that started when the gradual rise of mining capital-
ism — going back to the presidency of Linares, 1857-1861 — made of 
Bolivia a poster child of classical-liberal economic governance. The 
national revolution was thus a way of closing the rules book of the 
first wave of economic liberalism in Bolivia. 
ideological divergences and pressures from its enemy within and 
without compromised the revolution before it set Bolivia on a defini-
tive course.9 The arrival of neoliberalism in the 1980s was, to a signifi-
cant extent, a literal reversal of history: economic liberalism — recog-
nizable under a new garb —was reasserting its pre-eminence against 
what was clearly its antagonist— democracy. 
in these changed conditions, by the early 2000s, Bolivia was again 
in a state of crisis strongly reminiscent of the one that preceded the 
national revolution. The new oligarchy proved even more brittle than 
the older rosca-supported one, and the piling up of social catastrophes 
traceable directly to neoliberal-inspired policies triggered a collapse 
in state legitimacy marked by unprecedented violence.10 Similar also 
7 This includes coB which, though a union federation, was deeply unmeshed with 
the revolutionary state, its main leader, Juan Lechín, being first minister of mines 
and petroleum, and then vice-President in 1960-64. 
8 for a well-rounded presentation of the effects of this third role of ‘the state of ‘52’, 
see Klein (A Concise History of Bolivia, 2011: 265-270). 
9 See malloy (Bolivia: the Uncompleted Revolution, 1970). 
10 in their paper, arze and Kruse note, for instance, that ‘the second administration 
of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada […] killed more people in 14 months than 
did Gen. hugo Bánzer’s seven-year military dictatorship’ (‘The consequences of neo-
liberal reform’, 2004: 23), which was noted for its peculiar brutality. 
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to the period leading up to 1952, there was a new type of popular 
mobilization brewing in the country, in this case, that of politicized in-
digenous and mestizos groups. Thus, in general, the story of maS’ rise 
to power shows the presence of at least three of the four key elements 
detected as crucial for the success of reform in that of mnr: political 
will from above, popular agency from below, and agreement around a 
program of democratic reform. 
This did not take shape without often tense —and occasionally 
murderous —conflicts, but as a final element, the maS process add-
ed a ‘transformative constitution’ (Sunstein, 2001) rather than the 
transformative institutions that were a hallmark of the mnr reforms. 
This particular fact is key. it shows that the reform undertaken by 
maS is not directly aimed at the state. The constitution establishes 
new legal norms for the relations of state and society, but although 
it can legislate the action of state power, it does not organize new 
functional elements (such as comiBoL or the ministry of Peasant 
affairs in 1952) that would transform the magnitude of state power 
in support of a new class equilibrium, or in the service of a new 
dominant class.11 it must be noted on this latter score that if reform-
ing the state means, in this framework, building new organizations 
and getting them to work according to plans, neoliberal reform has 
been a simpler specie of reform of the state: it has mainly consisted 
in removing, rather than building organizations. overturning this 
process against the constraints —in state capacities especially— that 
it has created, is the defining challenge of a democratic reform of the 
state after neoliberalism. 
equipped with these lessons, i now turn to the case studies, 
and, in the conflictive situations that will be presented, i will dis-
cuss especially whether or not elements of political will, popular 
agency, a reform program and transformative institutions tend to 
come into play, why, and with what implications for a potential 
democratic reform. 
11 Kohl 2010’s review of maS ‘governance’ (i.e., state action) stresses several pa-
rameters of a ‘chaotic style of governance’ (‘Bolivia under morales’, 2010: 113) that 
especially denote the fact that this type of institution-building is either very slow 
to emerge, or altogether not forthcoming in today’s Bolivia. This may be partly 
related to the emphasis on the concept of ‘cultural identity’, which has played a far 
greater role in maS’ popular agency than in mnr’s. Some scholars — generally 
sympathetic to neoliberal reform — consider this a welcome change from class 
identification (see h. haarstad and v. andersson, ‘Backlash reconsidered’, 2009), 
ignoring that emphasis on cultural identity does not preclude, and may indeed 
reinforce, class identification — especially in a conservative fashion: but maybe 
they know this all too well!
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The two case studies are about relations of states with market gi-
ants — niger and areva nc, west Bengal / Gujarat and Tata motors 
— but my interest is not focused on the details of these relations. The 
cases have been selected on the basis of the light that they may shed 
especially on the power of the state following neoliberal reform, and 
given the peculiar social conditions in which they develop. in both 
cases, the four elements of the conceptual framework described above 
will be tested against the specific contextual elements of the case, and 
a short assessment will be drawn. following this, i will draw a wider 
conclusion on the meaning of the study for the issue of democratic 
reform in the Global South.
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nIger
rekIndlIng the socIAl contrAct
The niGerien STaTe waS ‘restructured’ by neoliberal reform in 
the period 1982-1998. independent from france in 1960, the state saw 
prevailing revenue sources dry up in the early 1970s, when the great 
Sahel drought reduced the country’s agriculture to a shambles and 
tropical commodities, such as groundnuts, niger’s primary export, lost 
much of their market value. But niger’s subsoil held large amounts of 
high quality uranium ore that had come online in 1968, and there was 
a mounting global trend in uranium consumption — significantly en-
ergized at mid-decade by the oil shocks — which brightened the state’s 
prospects, especially after 1974. in april of that year, military men 
had toppled the single party regime of the Parti Progressiste nigérien 
(PPn), in the wake of rural famine and the general economic crisis 
that was gripping the country. The windfall of uranium revenue led to 
ambitious plans of creating a ‘société de développement’ (‘development 
society’), one which would be based on defeating the specter of hun-
ger, transforming agriculture and improving education and health. 
Though authoritarian, the regime envisaged this development society 
to take shape through a gradual democratic reform of the state.1 in 
1 See the long theoretical preamble — a veritable essay — of the national charter 
adopted to this effect in 1987. The charter, write the authors of the Historical Dic-
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the meantime, it drastically increased the rate of public investment, 
which grew to 27% of GdP and spawned several new public enterpris-
es, rural development projects and infrastructure overhaul agendas. 
much of the new investment also went into infrastructure for mining, 
and the regime created an expert-led organization, the office national 
des ressources minières (onarem) to both prospect the territory 
and oversee the state’s interests in existing operations (such as the 
french-led exploitation of uranium in the desert north).  
Time was not on the side of the state of niger, however. while 
it took advantage of the easy international lending period of the late 
1970s, guaranteed by its uranium revenue, it rapidly plummeted by 
the end of the decade. Soon, niger found itself saddled with an enor-
mous debt, shorn of the best part of its revenue, and managing a large 
expenditures program of agricultural development and social policy. 
a soul-searching ‘national debate’ on the agricultural sector organ-
ized in 1982 took stock of the unsustainability of development plans, 
and the government approached the international monetary fund for 
financial relief. By the end of decade, public investment had been re-
duced to around 9% of GdP. 
The impact of neoliberal reform can also be measured in the evo-
lution of the structure of GdP. in the first two decades of independ-
ence (1960-80), the growth input of the primary and tertiary sectors 
(the latter, largely dominated by the so-called informal economy and 
more generally controlled by unproductive commercial capital) went 
down from a combined 82% of GdP in 1960 to 42% (primary sec-
tor) and 35% (tertiary sector) twenty years later, with much of the 
de-growth occurring in the period 1975-81. meanwhile, the secondary 
sector had grown to 23%. if it had been possible to sustain this trend 
at a regular pace, niger would have joined the ranks of so-called tran-
sitional economies by the early 2000s. as a result of the end of public 
investment, the primary and tertiary sector — and their insignificant 
wealth creation capacities — have gone up again while the secondary 
sector now fluctuates at around 4 to 5% of GdP. it must be noted that 
the end of the economic policy of ‘development’ was not just a mat-
ter of niger being ‘too poor’ to conduct such a policy. certainly, there 
was no easy way around poverty in productive capital: but other key 
factors were the weakness of the state system and niger’s vulnerable 
tionary of Niger, ‘defined the development society, the concept of the state, and the 
organization of the executive councils tasked with the mission of pushing the country 
forward using rules for (the motto went) ‘consultation, dialogue and participation’’ 
(a. idrissa and S. decalo, The Histotical Dictionary of Niger, Scarecrow Press, 2012: 
142). The ‘executive councils’ were clearly intended to be transformative institutions.
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position in the international political economy. Unlike india, for in-
stance, niger did not inherit a working civil service from its colonizer 
(owing to a shorter colonial occupation and the marginal position of 
the country in the france’s west african empire) and was still in the 
process of establishing some core state organizations in the 1980s.2 
in this sense, the urgency, from the local point of view, was not to cut 
the wage bill of the state in pursuit of the balanced budgets needed for 
debt repayment: rather, it was to expand — only more efficiently3 — its 
powers to carry out policy.  
in any case, the stunted evolution eventually put the nigerien 
social contract in disarray. in the early independence period (1960-
74), the elite class of the commis4 had taken over a state that was 
supported by the peasantry through commercial agriculture and 
taxation. The commis legitimized their rule by the agenda of devel-
opment, to be achieved through their mastery of modern science. By 
ruining agriculture — and literally decimating the peasantry — the 
great drought-cum-famine of the early 1970s seemed to upend the 
elite class’ legitimacy and in any case put an end to the social con-
tract of the country’s first republic (as the PPn’s rule is formally 
known in niger). Uranium, however, provided the basis for a suc-
cessor social contract, whereby the specific distinction of the elite 
class (the mastery of modern science) was still serving the state, but 
for a more wholesome benefit of a now unexploited peasantry. The 
thinking5 was that since drought and famine had shown that the 
2 The judiciary, for instance, was restricted to the main urban centers and until 
the 2000s, there were no attorneys based outside of the capital. in rural areas, the 
justice system relied until recently completely on traditional chiefs and the executive 
administration. yet neither democracy nor a liberal economy could operate at their 
optimum without the apparatus of the rule of law.   
3 in view of problems such as corruption, nepotism and analogous forms of dys-
function, which were also stressed by neoliberal reformers. 
4 from a french word meaning ‘clerk’ or ‘civil servant’ depending on the context. 
during the colonial period, the commis occupied clerical positions in government 
and business, and became the slim buffer class between the colonial rulers and the 
african population, developing a lifestyle closer to that of the europeans and essen-
tially growing into a local bourgeoisie after independence. in niger, the PPn was the 
party of the commis, which came to power upon defeating — mostly through fraud 
and violence — the Sawaba Party, a leftist formation that represented the country’s 
semi-urban proletariat of the talakawa (‘little folks’). See K. van walraven, The Yearn-
ing for Relief (2013). note that a similar semantic formation exists in india, where the 
word babu — a term of respect that came to mean ‘sir’ in the modern colonial context 
— was (and is still) applied to civil servants, and led to the ironic coinage ‘babudom’ 
to designate the civil service organization.    
5 This is mostly found in the grey literature of ministries reports and consultancy 
documents. The narrative part of this analysis is based on documentation graciously 
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peasantry could not contribute to development (let alone support 
the state) until agriculture had been radically transformed through 
higher productivity, the proceeds of uranium should be used to ef-
fect that transformation. after the debt crisis nipped this plan in the 
bud, structural adjustment did not propose an alternative solution: 
it destroyed the position of the elite class, both materially (layoffs 
following restructuration of state services) and symbolically (it was 
no longer in control of the development project that, despite its fail-
ings, still legitimized its leadership).  when niger democratized in 
1991, the country no longer had a working social contract — that 
is, a specific relation of accountability between the ruling class and 
those being ruled. This was an inauspicious introduction to demo-
cratic reform.
The economic policy of neoliberal reform in this case was 
externally enforced austerity.6 it would be properly described as 
a method of creating an acceptance of the reality of ‘under-devel-
opment’: lacking the financial capacities for jumpstarting a pro-
cess of economic transformation, the state simply had to be cut 
down to size and let things follow their ‘natural’ market-led course. 
The entire apparatus set in place to engineer the transformation 
of agriculture was thus gradually scaled down and phased out. By 
1991-92, its two pillars, the agricultural credit institution caisse 
nationale de crédit agricole and the national development Bank 
were both gone, which led to the rapid collapse of the cooperative 
system put in place in the early 1960s to create a policy space for 
the state in the rural areas. 
Parallel to this process, budget cuts starving the country’s sole 
university of credits had led to students’ unrest.7 after an incident 
in february 1990, that caused three deaths among the students, the 
regime became reluctant to use repression, folded and gave way to 
provided by the niamey-based Bureau nigérien d’etudes et de conseil en développe-
ment rural, as well as on interviews with officials from the agriculture ministry, both 
former and current. See also c. raynaut’s introduction to Politique Africaine’s 1990 
special issue on niger. 
6 See m. Gervais ‘Les enjeux politiques’ (1992) and ‘Structural adjustment in niger’ 
(1995), who interprets this as a story of niger dragging its feet to implement much 
needed reforms.  
7 Students — as well as civil servants — were routinely singled out in the neoliberal 
literature of the time as the enemies of ‘reform’, which they would oppose in view 
of keeping their ‘privileges’. See, for niger, especially the works of Gervais (‘Les en-
jeux politiques des ajustements structurels au niger’, 1992; ‘Structural adjustment 
in niger’, 1995; and ‘niger: regime change, economic crisis and Perpetuation of 
Privilege’, 1997).     
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a democratization process (summer 1991) led by the leaders of bur-
geoning political movements, unions and students organizations. The 
objective was vocally that of democratic reform directed against struc-
tural adjustment. a slogan then popular on the streets of niamey (ni-
ger’s capital) was the alliterative french-language phrase ‘Le PaS ne 
passera pas’.8at this juncture, there were elements of political will and 
popular agency at work, but the latter, only faintly. The driving actors 
of the democratic reform movement belonged to the elite class of the 
country, and this shows that political will was distinctly more impor-
tant than popular agency. and while democratization initially put a 
break on structural adjustment, the endemic fiscal crisis led the new 
leaders of the state of niger to relent by 1995 and to accept further 
retrenchment, especially since international aid — which, after the 
fall of uranium, had become the principal source of revenue — grew 
increasingly tied to agreements with the imf and the world Bank, the 
two armed hands of neoliberal reform.
while in theory, these institutions only advocated economic liber-
alization, in practice they insisted on a radical makeover of the state 
system. By the late 1990s, this was effectively achieved. in 1999, when 
the first government of the fully-‘neoliberalized’ state of niger — the 
government of President mamadou Tandja, 1999-20099 — took of-
fice, the state of niger had a thinner system, limited to government 
apparatus, basic administration and defense and security. Such a sys-
tem essentially removed it from society and erased the complexes of 
organizations which used to determine responsiveness and policy for-
mulation and implementation in the past. To ensure a modicum of 
governance, decentralization was adopted in 1998: local communities 
could elect their own home governments, which could collect smaller 
taxes than national policy would have demanded. Though dramatical-
ly substandard, local government is cheaper, and is something niger’s 
indigent peasants could afford. 
hence, the nigerien leader who got himself voted at the head of 
the state after 1998 was no longer heading the same state as those in 
the previous era. in particular, he would have at disposal much less 
tools and apparatuses for developing and conducting policy. Since 
the state system is a unit, changes in some component parts affect 
8 Literally, ‘SaP [Structural adjustment Program] will not come to pass’. for an 
early analysis of such democratic resistance to neoliberal reform, see Beckman (‘em-
powerment or repression’, 1991).  
9 Tandja remained in office nearly two months after the expiry of his second term, 
in december 2009, and had to be forcibly removed from power by the army in febru-
ary 2010. 
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the entire functioning of the unit. Thus, not all state organizations 
were eliminated by neoliberal reform, but their overall policy impact 
was modified and, in general, reduced by the disappearance of sup-
pressed entities.10 
in the mining sector, the above-mentioned onarem existed un-
til 2007, when it was divided in two distinct entities, one in charge of 
its duty of overseeing the mining interests of the state (the Société du 
Patrimoine des mines du niger, SoPamin) and the other succeeding 
to its prospection mission (the centre pour l’exploration Géologique 
et minière, crGm). SoPamin, crGm, together with a mining code 
adopted in 2006, underline the continued hopes which the state of 
niger invest in mining as the primary source of public funds. But as 
we have seen, this reliance dates back to 1974 and was initially part 
of a project which had organized state power in certain specific ways 
to achieve its aims. Three decades later, after neoliberal reform, this 
emphasis on mining revenue had become an orphan strategy, even 
though the state of niger finds it must still pursue it. Thus, upon 
taking office, Tandja and his government immediately focused on in-
creasing mining revenue. as various officials told this researcher, his 
party had come to power in a world where ‘there [were] no friends, 
only interests’.11aid is volatile and conditioned to often-unrealistic 
prescriptions and expectations, and increased taxation remains a 
problematic proposition in the conditions of niger.12 increasing rev-
enue from mining, on the other hand, could finance a degree of state 
autonomy. The nigerien fifth republic maintained excellent rela-
tions with the imf and its leaders never appeared to reject neoliberal 
principles — in fact, its ruling party, the mouvement national pour 
la Société de développement, tended to present itself as a ‘liberal’ 
party, in the french sense of the word (i.e., economic, not political/
social). But state autonomy was sought for two interrelated reasons: 
first, the ability of arranging public spending in ways that would 
help the prospects for re-election of the president; and second, the 
10 for a full analysis of the rationale of neoliberal reform of state institutions in af-
rica, see mkandawire, (‘institutional monocropping and monotasking in africa’, n/d). 
11 This now very conventional wisdom in niger — leaders of the students union 
repeated the same phrase during interviews — seems to encapsulate a (neoliberal) 
zeitgeist that stresses individualism and competitiveness, including with regard to 
inter-state relations.   
12 increased taxation is the preferred revenue mobilization avenue in neoliberal re-
form, as is shown by prescriptions from both the west african economic and mon-
etary Union (waemU) and the imf. The state of niger is trying to comply, with lim-
ited success and the memory of the serious popular unrest that rocked the country 
after imf-pushed tax hikes in 2005. 
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latter was a member of the military junta that tried to spur the trans-
formation of agriculture in the 1980s, and he explicitly wanted to 
revive that policy, at least in part. Significantly, however, Tandja did 
not resort, in pursuance of this double goal, to amending the state 
system. instead, he used a non-institutional mode of action popular-
ized by aid regimes, putting in place a so-called ‘special program’ 
of the president of the republic — a fundraising outfit which both 
enhanced his personal prestige and channeled money in projects tar-
geting the agricultural sector and the ‘monde rural’ (‘rural popula-
tion’). as his attempt at overturning the constitution and restoring 
autocracy in late 2009 clearly shows, Tandja’s project was far from 
a democratic reform of the state. he strongly identified with niger’s 
elite class, using the ‘special program’ in a framework of evergetism 
that enhanced his elite stature, and reserving the discussion of issues 
of central relevance to the state to members of the elite class. he said 
as much in a televised speech where, after glorying in his paternal 
care for the hungry peasants of niger, he concluded: ‘as for impor-
tant topics, such as the issue of uranium, of petroleum, they do not 
concern those poor people’.13 The rhetoric of care for the peasantry 
is a staple of niger’s elite class since the commis of the 1960s, but in 
the neoliberal era, it no longer corresponds to a structure of respon-
sibility such as the one evidenced by the social contracts that existed 
under the first republic and the military regime. 
Such specious elite views, non-institutional modes of action, and 
the temptation of autocracy — underlined by a greater reliance on the 
repressive functions of the state14 — are if not caused, at least strongly 
stimulated by the neoliberal state system. a parsimonious system with 
little direct connections to society, it is hence better controlled by and 
for the advantage of the elite class. with much fewer public institu-
tions, it leaves extensive room for non-institutional manipulations that 
sidestep the need for democratic accountability. in such a context, it 
appears natural to argue that the more ‘important’ issues are not the 
concern of the people. if the case of Tandja provides a vivid illustra-
tion of the exercise of power in a neoliberal state system, it should 
not be construed as an isolated instance of the fact. after Tandja was 
13 from nigerien weekly La Roue de l’Histoire, online resource. interestingly 
enough, this was stated four years after his fall, which underlines the strength of his 
class beliefs.
14 one symbol of this was the establishment, in 2003, of the high security prison 
of Koutou Kalé, in a craggy wilderness some 30 km outside the capital. Though of-
ficially destined for ‘hardened criminals,’ it soon became famous for hosting pesky 
journalists and troublesome opposition figures arrested on trumped-up charges or 
through harsh interpretations of the law. 
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removed in 2010, the nigerien political class which, in its majority, 
had opposed his attempt at autocratic restoration, tried to rekindle 
the process of democratic reform of politics which started in 1991 and 
had run into the sand of neoliberalism.15 a new constitution adopted 
in 2011 legislated strong legal protections for journalists and opposi-
tion figures, casting opprobrium on Tandja era repression. Language 
in both the constitution and the political program of the Parti nigérien 
pour la démocratie et le Socialisme (PndS), which won the elections, 
indicted autocracy and called for the strengthening of democratic in-
stitutions. Unlike in previous nigerien constitutions, the framers of 
this one went out of their way to name and reject ‘dictatorship’ as a 
form of government, while the first point of the PndS’ program insists 
that ‘niger needs strong institutions rather than strong men’, stressing 
that ‘strong, creditable and sustainable democratic institutions’ must 
be built to protect the ‘respectability’ of ‘the republic’.16
The stance implies that the PndS government, unlike its prede-
cessor, demonstrates an amount of political will toward democratic 
reform. if its criticism of neoliberalism is not strident, it certainly also 
quietly guides its key actions. in a deliberately anti-hayekian move, 
the new government resurrected, in its first cabinet, the ministry of 
Planning that was an early casualty of neoliberal reform in the 1990s. 
The public sector soon thereafter went on a veritable recruitment 
binge. in the first two years of its tenure, the PndS government hired 
over 30,000 in the public sector, significantly more than the entire 
private sector (over 22,000 recruitments) — and also more than the 
mnSd government during much of its ten-year tenure.17 in particular, 
it offered positions in provincial and rural health units to all new med-
icine graduates who would apply to serve the state while also ramping 
up the provision of state scholarships to students. Given the systemic 
nature of state action, these and other moves of the PndS can, how-
ever, achieve their aims only if they succeed in transcending the neo-
liberal state system that has solidified in niger since the mid-1990s. in 
my hypothesis — derived from the conceptual framework described 
in the first section of this paper — this would be possible only as a 
15 at that specific juncture, the events of 1991 received for the first time symbolic 
public recognition: a street was renamed after the national conference of the sum-
mer 1991, and the sports hall in which it had convened was also given the name ‘pal-
ace of the sovereign national conference’ following a solemn christening ceremony.  
16 constitution of niger’s Seventh republic, Preamble (2010); and ‘Niger: La Renais-
sance’ (Programme PndS Tarayya, 2011: 5). 
17 a recent investigation by this researcher among university graduates shows a 
newly-expressed preference for public sector jobs, while until very recently all studies 
indicated preference for the private sector in that population. 
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result of a successful democratic reform of the state, insofar as this 
specific reform agenda has been the historical antagonist of neoliberal 
reform. are the elements of such a democratic reform of the state — 
political will, popular agency, common program and transformative 
institutions — present enough in today’s niger to sustain a shift in 
that direction? The question posed in this way can obviously receive 
no straightforward response, especially in the short space of this pa-
per, and what i propose here is to end this exploration of the nigerien 
case with the ‘important topic’ of mining as a way to approaching the 
abovementioned four elements.
as previously noted, under the fifth republic, there were re-
newed efforts at increasing mining revenue. niger’s mining law was 
revised in 2006, rising royalty rates for larger exploitations from 5.5% 
to 12%. however, if the new rule applied to petroleum — which had 
come online in the late 2000s — the biggest prize, uranium, held by 
french industry giant areva nc, was shielded at the time from the 
new levy by the fact that the contract tying areva to the state of niger 
would expire only in 2013.18 not only did areva continue to pay low-
end royalties to niger, it also kept the generous fiscal exemptions and 
related benefits it had inherited from the previous mining law, adopt-
ed in 1993. in 2013, when areva needed to negotiate an extension 
contract, it faced a PndS’ government that had hedged its bets for 
the revival of state-led development on increased revenue from the 
mining sector. indeed, while in 2000, the sector contributed only 5.5 
billion cfa fr. to state revenue, by 2007, it was contributing over 82 
billion — an incredible 14-fold increase in just a half-dozen years.19 
The vagaries of commodity markets have since brought this down 
several notches — still, always above 50 billion — but if uranium — 
by far niger’s choicest mineral riches — were to pay high-end royal-
ties as legislated in 2006, the impact on state revenue would be quite 
dramatic. areva resisted this. The company had signed the expired 
contract under the law of 1993, an investor-friendly piece of legisla-
tion from a time when foreign capital was snubbing the country’s 
mines. on the other hand, its mining titles were secured in 1968 for 
75 years. in 2003, waemU put out a community mining code which 
guaranteed ‘fiscal stability’ for the duration of mining titles in mem-
ber countries. claiming that community law supersedes national law, 
18 however, in order to grab a newly-found giant uranium deposit, the biggest in 
africa, areva accepted, in 2007, a 50% increase in the kilo price paid to niger.  
19 See the report commissioned in 2011 by the niger branch of the extractive in-
dustries Transparency initiative, chapter ii, ab initio (pages non-numbered) online 
resource. 
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areva argued that, as per waemU’S regulations, the exemptions and 
tax breaks it received in 1993 should last until 2043 — that is, 75 years 
after 1968, the duration of its mining titles. 
The ensuing showdown between areva and the state of niger 
— and more generally, niger’s relationships with mining companies 
— has mobilized sections of the populace in support of the state’s 
positions in the protracted negotiations. outwardly, the mobilization 
was concentrated in the civil society and the students union, and 
geographically limited to the capital and the northern city of aga-
dez. however, it ended up extending into the written press, the social 
media, and both television and radio debates and editorials, includ-
ing especially in the ‘national languages,’ in a country where only 
about 10% of the population use the official tongue (french). for 
the first time in niger’s history, uranium and other mining interest 
thus became a topic of discussion among ‘the poor people’ (to quote 
Tandja’s nonchalant phrase). demonstrations were strategically di-
rected at the media — including the international media, which have 
echo in france — even though the aim commonly agreed upon by 
leaders of the involved civil society organizations and unions was to 
maintain pressure on the government of niger. But it also became 
manifest that the nigerien government hardly needed prodding and 
was intent on modifying the terms on which areva exploits niger’s 
uranium. added demands required areva to rebuild transport in-
frastructure and, more importantly, to cede to niger the control of 
cominak and Somaïr, the two companies from which the state draws 
shareholder dividends — a move which amounts to a renegotiation, 
if not a rejection, of the entente that underlies areva’s operations in 
niger since 1968.20 The consensus on the issue also extended to the 
opposition parties. By october 2014, the government had approved 
the new deal, with the expectation of reaping $39 m. annually from 
the mining. Such hopes have since been dampened by a steep down-
turn in the fickle uranium market (the price of the ore’s kilogram fell 
from heights of $135 in the late 2000s to just $40 in 2015). But the 
story is, in fact, only a sequence in niger’s struggle to redefine its 
mining policy as a source of development capital for the state.
20 areva, which is 91% owned by the french state, is a successor company to the 
constellation of french public institutions and enterprises that dealt with the fledg-
ling state of niger in the 1960s. france took control of Somaïr through aid, when 
the nigerien state borrowed from its cooperation agency to buy its shares in the 
company. french control of Somaïr and cominak in particular means that the state 
of niger lacks intelligence in the commercialization of the ore and the profitability of 
the companies, something which has constantly strengthened the french hand dur-
ing negotiations.    
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So there is clearly a congruence of ‘political will’ and ‘popular 
agency’ on this particular issue. To be sure, popular agency is here 
outwardly limited to the elite class. The handful of mine workers have 
remained quiescent21 and the talakawa, both urban and rural, only 
comment and observe. Given the historical context described at some 
length in this section, however, the meaning of this episode is easier to 
interpret. niger’s natural resources do not belong in the major league 
in their categories. while uranium is abundant and of high quality, it 
is also difficult to export given the distance to the sea — nearly 2,500 
km — and the security situation in the country’s desert north. regard-
ing petroleum, with only 20,000 barrels a day, niger count among the 
smallest producers in africa. and gold, produced in western niger, 
is far more volatile in value than either uranium or oil. But niger’s 
experience has shown that the surplus capital needed to jumpstart 
the process of development can come neither from taxation, nor from 
agriculture (in its current state) — while aid (at least western aid) is 
tied to austerity prescriptions, which do not aim at transforming the 
economy. Thus, the mining rent appears as the state’s only remaining 
option, especially as it seeks to revive the state-led development pro-
ject disallowed by neoliberal reform. The desire to hold on to power 
(Tandja), or a more ideological intention at reforming the state (issou-
fou), have created a political will in redefining niger’s mining policy to 
the advantage of the state. This political will is supported by popular 
agency — limited to the elite class — and a quieter popular support 
from other classes of nigerien society. 
however, this has not led to an agreed-upon reform program. 
There is clearly an elite class consensus around the notion that capi-
tal from the mining rent — together with the investment and lending 
that it would attract — would rekindle niger’s social contract and ul-
timately re-establish the elite class’ legitimacy as the country’s ruling 
class. But this consensus does not appear to crystallize into a reform 
program that would associate also the other classes in the nigerien 
polity. if it limits itself to shoring up elite rule, as it appears to be do-
ing, it is safe to say the PndS’ thrust at — or pledge to — institutional-
ize democracy in niger will make only trivial dents on the neoliberal 
state system of the country. Looking at the relations of the indian state 
of west Bengal with another market giant, Tata motors, may help us 
to better understand the general stakes behind the niger story.
21 owing to the downturn, by 2015, most have lost their job in a downsizing scheme 





aS haS Been menTioned Before, the case of india is very dif-
ferent from niger. even leaving aside the size and complexity dif-
ferentials (india is more comparable perhaps to africa than to a 
sub-unit of africa such as niger), in the spectrum of structural eco-
nomic transformation, or development as it were, niger lies at an 
initial point — with Bolivia further ahead, but closer to it than to 
india — while india is now largely a transitional economy. if the main 
concern of the state of niger is primary capital extraction from natu-
ral resources, the indian state coordinates capital-intensive industri-
alization and is faced with the problem of redistribution; and while 
niger’s sociology is a comparatively simple one (simpler, certainly, 
than in the pre-colonial era), india’s is much harder to chart with 
the required tact and accuracy, given in particular the fact that caste 
and culture play an important role alongside class. Sticking to a class 
framework, it can be said that india has three key class-groupings: 
the monopoly (now corporate) capitalist and big bourgeoisie layers; 
the rural gentry and closely linked small bourgeoisie (with a grow-
ing new urban middle class); and the masses of the toiling people, in 
town, country and forest.1 in this way, the underlying story of india’s 
1 inspired and adapted from ‘indira Gandhi: an attempt at a Political appraisal’, an 
anonymous essay (signed ‘K. B.’) in a 1985 issue of Economic and Political Weekly.   
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evolution broadly lends itself to the conceptual framework devised in 
the first section of this paper, and the fact that india is so different 
from niger is a good test of its relative worth as an analytical tool for 
the purposes of this paper.
more than in the case of the nigerien state, the product largely 
of the independence era, key functional elements of the indian state 
were created during the colonial period. That was especially the case 
of those elements which neoliberal reform tends to preserve: basic 
administration and defense and security. The colonial government 
needed economic order and security for the sake of imperial inves-
tors. Given the vital importance of india in the imperial economy of 
Britain, these requisites had the benefit of providing india with sound 
basic state institutions by independence.2 also, it was under British 
domination that the class distribution of modern india — as distinct 
from the one extant in the mughal and rajput period — gradually took 
shape, leading to an early independence social contract where, similar 
to what we have seen in niger, the modern-educated elite seized con-
trol of the state in the name of development. 
The large internal economy of india and its more complex class 
distribution complicated this, however. in particular, not only were 
the interests of the propertied and popular classes distinct, there 
were also significant differences among the propertied classes, with 
differing interpretations of the meaning and implication of develop-
ment. The early development policies of the indian state show, at 
any rate, that the preferred model was state-led, and the dedication 
of india’s first Prime minister, Jawaharlal nehru, to parliamentary 
democracy, also ensured that this state-led model of development 
was not to be authoritarian as in much of the Global South at the 
time. The state ramped up its power, built infrastructure, and for-
mulated an industrial policy as well as an agricultural intensification 
policy that led to a ‘green revolution’ toward the end of the 1960s. 
These mainstays of development policy would satisfy the propertied 
classes, while populist programs undertaken especially under Prime 
minister indira Gandhi (1966-77) directed state patronage toward 
the poor. indira Gandhi also used the power of the state to expand 
credit and savings into the rural areas and through the country’s 
large ‘informal’ sector (bank nationalizations of 1969).3 all of these 
2 for a summary, see maddison (‘The economic and Social impact of colonial rule 
in india’, 2006b [1971]: chapter 3).
3 This is of notable importance, contributing to creating india’s peculiarity as a 




policies, though serving chiefly the propertied classes, sometimes at 
the expense of the popular classes,4 had real overall transformative 
potentials and (in some cases) effects. 
The indian model ran however into a crisis of transition by the 
mid-1960s. while the propertied classes had successfully replaced — 
with the indispensable help of the state — imperial capitalists through 
the first decade of independence, the next stage was to successfully 
compete with international capitalists to avoid being consigned to a 
peripheral and menial position in the international political economy. 
also, without transition, india’s vast poor population was feeling more 
acutely the brunt of exploitation and neglect. 
The transition crisis not only generated a conflict within the 
ruling class — between those who tied their ideal of prosperity to a 
state-protected internal market and those who wanted the state to 
open the country — but it also happened in a difficult context, both 
nationally and internationally (in the late 1960s, drought and fam-
ine, war with Pakistan, and currency instability; in the 1970s, the 
oil shocks and recession). The transition crisis translated politically 
into a crisis of the state and of parliamentary democracy through 
much of the 1970s. while a fragmented and weak political opposi-
tion failed to defeat Gandhi at the polls, she turned toward so-called 
‘pragmatic’ policies, which no longer reflected the choices of now 
deeply divided ruling classes, but essentially seemed to strengthen 
her hold on power. economically, those were inadequate policies, 
fostering a corrupt status quo5 and increasing dissatisfaction in the 
ruling classes. The latter phenomenon took several forms, includ-
ing a high-minded defense of democracy by the elderly socialist 
Jayaprakash narayan in 1975-76, but mostly, the objective became 
to put an end to Gandhi’s rule. Lashing out against her opponents 
during the state of emergency she had proclaimed in June 1975, 
Gandhi succeeded in uniting their political representatives in the 
4 This was especially visible during the building of large dams, which would neces-
sitate land confiscation and the displacement of masses of people, generally poor. 
5 This situation, characterized by disparaging phrases (‘hindu rate of growth’, 
‘license-permit-quota-subsidy raj’, ‘political economy of stagnation’), was summed 
up by mansingh as ‘a nexus among corrupt politicians, corrupt bureaucrats, and 
corrupt business houses’ (Historical Dictionary of India, 2006: 30). The paroxysm 
of Gandhi’s authoritarian tendencies was reached when she declared a state of 
emergency in June 1975. writing in hindsight, mansingh described the episode 
(which lasted 21 months) as an ‘aberrant […] period of incipient authoritarian-
ism’ (ibid.: 207), which is just what it was, although analysts pondering events at 
the time feared the worst (Kozicki, ‘The demise of indian democracy’, 1975). for 
a rich contextualization, see chapters iX and X of Krishna ananth’s India since 
Independence (2009). 
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motley Janata Party, which beat her at the polls in 1977. But the 
economic situation only further deteriorated — in part because the 
Janata Party proved incapable of backing the policies of its ablest 
Prime minister, charan Singh (1979-80) — and Gandhi returned to 
power in January 1980.
in the changed conditions of the 1980s, Gandhi — imitated after 
her assassination in 1984 by her successors — started reorienting the 
state toward market liberalization. This was announced — indirectly 
— in both the industrial Policy Statement of July 1980 and the Sixth 
five-year Plan, which showed a new willingness to stimulate the tran-
sition of the indian economy into international levels of competitive-
ness. measures linking industrial growth to export performance were 
taken in diverse policy areas, and were poised to expand corporate 
capitalism, even if in limited ways. Some incoherence marked those 
policies, where exports ended up being absorbed by domestic demand 
and where liberalization spurred both a costly — in terms of balance 
of payments — import of capital goods and the transformation of 
state-protected monopoly capitalism into international-allied monop-
oly capitalism, among other policy miscarriages.6 overall, however, 
they were not a failure from the point of view of policy-makers. in 
particular, they managed to expand the scope of corporate capitalism 
without undermining the state system. Liberalization was as a means 
toward the end of a transition to higher industrialization, which was 
still to be organized by the state. Thus, the fiscal crisis resulting from 
the policy incoherencies of the 1980s, though apparently similar to 
the one which destroyed the fragile economies of Bolivia and niger 
in the early 1980s, became here the pretext for using that instrument 
(liberalization) more freely. 
indeed, in the case of india, a radical break that could be charac-
terized as ‘neoliberal reform’ did not occur. The break, if such it was, 
came in 1980,7 when market liberalization became a key policy op-
tion for the indian state, and when segments of the industrial sector 
emerged or grew thanks to its decisions. This in turn made possible 
some of the reforms developed in the 1990s, both technically and — 
more importantly — politically. while the central indian governments 
6 See the detailed contemporary analysis of the new measures and their economic 
effects by Kurien (‘indian economy in the 1980s and on to the 1990s’, 1989).
7 here, there is agreement between Kohli (‘Politics of economic Growth in india, 
1980-2005’, 2006); and corbridge et al. (‘when and why did india Take off’, chapter 
2 of India Today: Economy, Politics and Society, 2013). The latter also show the un-




of the 1990s may well have harbored neoliberal reformers,8 it remains 
that neoliberal reform as a package could not easily be implemented 
in the context of a country where the ruling classes had recognized 
the pacifying value of the democratic process — certainly after the 
troubles of the late 1970s — and where there was no firm consensus 
among them on neoliberalism. how then are we to characterize what 
happened in india after 1991? 
The balance of payments crisis had to be solved, and this was 
done chiefly by drastically reducing public investment. The general 
effect of the market liberalization initiative, combining with this de-
cline in public investment, expanded the power of corporate capital 
as an agent in the indian development model. moreover, the cen-
tral state’s activism was reduced across the land, giving that much 
salience to regional disparities, as responsibilities for development 
were gradually offloaded onto individual states (this process is akin, 
in a more informal way, to the decentralization reform seen in the 
case of niger). on the other hand, despite continuing — yet still 
modest — opening of the economy to international market forces, 
the measured pace of neoliberal-style reforms has preserved the 
coherence of the internal economy and the dominance of national 
industry actors. what was accomplished by the reforms was to put 
india’s wealth — land, labor, government work — at the service of 
those actors through the steady but disparate birthing of a mar-
ket economy — the neoliberal concept of development as it were — 
across the land. The state-led development model has, in this way, 
lost most of its significance, but it has not been straightforwardly 
replaced by neoliberal reform (as in niger or Bolivia). rather, it is 
now left to individual states within the Union to define — in accord-
ance with regional conditions — the uses to which they would put 
the liberalization instrument, in a context where competition to at-
tract private investment greatly constrains or reduces their choices. 
it is this ambiguous situation that i now propose to explore by en-
gaging in an exercise similar to the one conducted with the nigerien 
case: that is, approaching the issue through a single revealing event 
— here, the transfer of an automobile plant from west Bengal to 
Gujarat — and assess thereby the implications for democratic re-
form in the case country.
The short story is this: in the early 2000s, Tata motors, an indian 
market giant, created stiff competition among the states for receiv-
ing the site of the plant for its new project, the ‘nano,’ a cheap mini-
8 Such would have been manmohan Singh, Prime minister in 2004-2014 and fi-
nance minister in 1991. 
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car with the famously low price tag of ‘one lakh’ (100,000 rupees 
or 2,300 USd), designed for india’s majority struggling population. 
west Bengal beat the competition by leasing land to the company in 
Singur, a small rural town in the vicinity of the state capital, Kolkata. 
The land, intended to host both the car plant and its ancillaries in 
an industrial complex, was expropriated from farmers using an abu-
sive interpretation of eminent domain law, and cash compensation. 
Some of the farmers protested, first in the courts (where they lost 
their case), then on the streets, causing repression and the interven-
tion of a coalition of rights-defending organizations and individuals, 
as well as that of opposition politicians.9 Given the turmoil and vio-
lence, Tata motors reviewed its options and, in october 2008, was in-
vited into Gujarat by a text message from that state’s chief minister, 
narendra modi (now the country’s Prime minister). Gujarat offered 
land already occupied by the state at Sanand to the ‘nano’ project, 
thus avoiding controversy.
The event has been abundantly analyzed and commented by in-
dian scholars10 and i am here interested in two aspects of what had 
transpired at that point: the attitudes of actors in west Bengal relative 
to the Tata project and the underlying idea of development behind its 
support by the west Bengal government; and a comparison of these 
attitudes with the Sanand denouement.
The west Bengal state was run at the time by the communist 
Party of india (marxist) (cPi-m), which of course inspired no end 
of irony on the fact that it had courted a market giant while tram-
pling the rural proletariat. This is all the more curious since cPi-m, 
which, by then, had been in power in Kolkata uninterruptedly for 31 
years, had grounded its hegemony in rural supremacy. The scholarly 
consensus on this subject is that cPi-m in west Bengal had created 
stability at the expense of development. more specifically, since the 
late 1970s, the party had successfully displaced the larger landown-
ing classes — favorable to congress — and brought about a west 
Bengal of smallholders, including through ‘operation Barga’, a poli-
cy of land reform which secured the rights of sharecroppers against 
rich landowners. These actions provided a stable basis for the party’s 
9 for a detailed analysis of these events and their underpinnings and implications, 
see chandra (‘Tata motors in Singur’, 2008).
10 See in particular Sud (‘The nano and Good Governance in Gujarat’, 2008) to be 
read against the background of her earlier piece (‘from Land to the Tiller to Land 
Liberalisation’, 2007); roy (‘Gujarat’s Gain and Bengal’s Loss?’, 2011); Baumik (‘The 
Singur controversy: a causal analysis’, 2011) online resource; and Kumar (‘Tata 
nano: a Study on Business challenges in india’, 2012) blog post.
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dominance in the majority poor population of the state. at the same 
time, west Bengal was, however, also taken into the general indian 
dilemma of transition to a higher stage of development which started 
to brew in the country in the 1970s. 
in this case, the lack of development was directly connected to 
the hegemonic structure of cPi-m, since a system of smallholding, 
largely subsistence agriculture, can hardly provide the surplus capi-
tal needed for starting such a process (compare to niger). as a result, 
large sections of the peasantry suffered a process of marginalization, 
while even the beneficiaries of cPi-m policies were confronted with 
the limitations of stagnant development. democratic reform might 
have provided a solution through the ideal combination of political 
will and popular agency leading to transformative institutions, and 
this was clearly what was envisaged by the reform of the Panchayat 
(rural government) system in 1983. not only was the new Panchayat 
act adopted that year destined to better organize popular agency 
at local levels, it also aimed at providing the institutional space the 
state needed to implement its rural development policies (includ-
ing the then on-going operation Barga). But as the instability cre-
ated by economic stagnation increased, the party also increasingly 
resorted to patronage and intimidation — rather than to democratic 
practice — to maintain its hold on power, an objective which even-
tually became paramount.11By the early 2000s, cPi-m was moving 
toward neoliberal reform in order to attract private capital, argu-
ing that ‘land reform was not an end in itself and industrialization 
was necessary for moving into the next phase of development’.12 The 
key implication, here, is that the party had decided to give up on 
the transformation of agriculture — which, from a political point of 
view, would have entailed democratic reform — and opted to climb 
onto the national bandwagon of corporate-led development.13 from 
11 See the analysis of Bandhyopadhyay and dinda (‘neo-Liberalism and Protest in 
west Bengal’, 2013: 10). 
12 (ibid.: 14). in a study on a more successful land acquisition story — the one des-
tined to support the creation of an ‘airport city’ in andal, Gopa Samanta notes that 
this was done despite the fact that west Bengal lags behind ‘many states of india in 
generating revenue from industrial growth’. referring to the Singur debacle, Saman-
ta also adds that in the case of andal, the land was not very productive and could be 
worked with some profit only by big landowners with the means to supplement poor 
water supply with small tanks of water. Those big landowners did not put up a fight, 
and most small farmers took the compensation despite their reluctance. Samanta 
(‘making an airport city’, 2015).
13 Before the Singur debacle, cPi-m had encountered a similar fiasco at nandigram, 
in march 2007, when it tried to transfer farmland to the indonesia-based Salim Group’s 
industrial project of a Special economic zone there. it did not learn from the episode. 
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this perspective, its mistreatment of smallholders is logical, although 
it was also self-defeating. indeed, all analysts are agreed that the 
population of Singur was not hostile to the Tata project, and many 
among them expected to profit from industrial work and attendant 
business. however, they did not understand this to mean that agri-
cultural work needed to be forfeited altogether. The underlying con-
cept of development for the rural poor combined the relative security 
of agriculture — relative to potential salaried jobs — to the relative 
opportunities of industry, while the government in fact viewed agri-
culture and industry as opposites because, in the existing scheme of 
things (which it was principally responsible for creating), the latter 
produced capital, and the former, not.
The situation in this west Bengal story was therefore this: there 
was no political will for democratic reform among the rulers of the 
state at that point;14 yet there was much popular agency, both among 
the smallholders and the small bourgeoisie that staffed the civil socie-
ty; a reform program could not take form in the absence of the politi-
cal will factor and potential transformative institutions (Panchayats, 
ministry of Land and Land reforms) remained therefore in a state of 
inaction. The people eventually voted the cPi-m out in 2011, replac-
ing it by a coalition led by the all india Trinamool congress (Tmc), 
the party of mamata Bannerjee. one of her first decisions was to or-
ganize the vote of a law that would return 400 acres of land to the 
unwilling farmers of Singur, but Tata — which still holds the lease 
— has successfully resisted the law at both west Bengal’s high court 
and india’s Supreme court.  
in Gujarat, the state that took over the Tata project, the process 
went down quietly. while farmers in Sanand initially protested about 
the selling of fertile land to industry and worried about compensa-
tion, the government, using a local middleman — ravubha vaghela, a 
wily businessman in the good graces of the traditional royalty of the 
Sanand area — succeeded in organizing a running land fair through 
which farmers sold their plots to the government and to private inves-
tors. in due course, the nano factory opened and went into operation 
while Sanand was transformed into a boomtown in its own right.15 in 
other words, in Gujarat, the government had used the profit motive — 
14 But perhaps there was some among the larger ruling classes, especially if we be-
lieve the claims of mamata Bannerjee, then the major opposition figure, now chief 
minister and also minister of Land and Land reforms — the one potential trans-
formative institution for rural west Bengal. 




a central premise of modi’s policies — and other instruments to avoid 
the fate of Singur. according to nikita Sud, authoritarian decision-
making and lack of transparency were key to the modi-Tata success. 
But to understand this outcome, it is perhaps best to view west 
Bengal and Gujarat in the roles they had taken within the general 
evolution of india at the beginning of the twenty-first century: that is, 
corporate-led development as a solution to the dilemma of the coun-
try’s position in the international political economy, and the tension 
that this creates between growth and redistribution. Both states are 
counted among the more developed units of the indian federation, 
and also, both are modern expressions of historically prestigious 
regions with identification to distinct civilizations — the mercan-
tile and spiritual Gujarat and the industrial and intellectual Bengal. 
Both cases show also that the second wave of economic liberalism 
in india, where democratic governance is older than in Bolivia and 
niger, has led states like west Bengal and Gujarat to upend core 
aspects of democracy and therefore conduct the reverse of a demo-
cratic reform of the state. in effect, both the cPi-m and modi had 
resorted to authoritarian means to impose an agenda which favored 
market forces over popular agency. in this perspective, both political 
actors consciously wished to emulate countries in east asia where 
the force of the state was used to build powerful market economies.16 
This sometimes erupts in violence against components of civil soci-
ety seen as presenting an obstacle to the desired evolution. during 
the early land acquisition showdown between the marxist govern-
ment of west Bengal and the small farmers of nandigram, there 
were pitched battles, rapes and house demolition caused by militant 
communist groups angry at peasant resistance to what they saw as 
a model of progress offered up to the world and to history by chi-
na.17 on some level, the mass violence against muslims in Gujarat, 
in 2002, obeys to a similar logic in that muslims were seen as frac-
turing the cultural (hindu) homogeneity upon which Gujarat would 
establish the conditions of prosperity. in Gujarat beyond Gandhi, me-
hta mentions a hagiography of chief minister modi that intended to 
demonstrate that the violence indeed did nothing to Gujarat’s grow-
ing economy — thus postulating that muslims were not a factor in it. 
not only that, ‘the Gujarat chamber of commerce (Gcci) estimates 
16 in the case of now Prime minister modi, this is presented in glowing terms 
in a recent essay of Sanjeev Sanyal in the Deccan Chronicle (‘india’s east asian 
dream’, 2014). 
17 See The Guardian, ‘Six Killed as farmers and communists clash in west Bengal’ 
(ramesh, 2012). 
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that only some 15% of small, medium and tiny units were affected. 
it first claimed that 600 hotels were affected and later corrected it to 
220. even more tellingly, it points out how during the early riot pe-
riod of 1 march-15 april, ahmedabad’s banks cleared more cheques 
[…] than in previous months’ (mehta, 2011: 124). at any rate, both 
Gujarat and west Bengal (under the marxist government) were pur-
suing growth at the expense of redistribution — the first on the basis 
of a right-wing, culturalist ideology, and the second on the basis of 
a left-wing, classist ideology. what they both had in common, and 
which differentiated them from their east asian models, was that 
they were pursuing their goal carried by the second wave of econom-
ic liberalism as it was driving its way through the thickets of india’s 
economy and politics. The greater success of Gujarat — besides the 
stability of its government — was then very likely due to the fact 
that modi’s political base of wealthy businesspeople, the rising urban 
middle class and affluent expatriates has more natural affinities with 
economic liberalism than the militant leftist intellectuals of west 
Bengal. But this greater success, consisting in an elite consensus in 
favor of growth (private industry, supporting infrastructure and leg-
islation) and against redistribution (jobs and social security), starkly 
came at the expense of democracy. 
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conclusIon
deSPiTe The received wiSdom of the mainstream literature 
in political science, the coincidence of the ‘third wave’ of democ-
ratizations and the ‘second wave’ of economic liberalism was a 
misfortune for democracy. The mainstream literature generally as-
sumes that neoliberal reform and democracy are mutually sustain-
ing, and that roadblocks to democracy are to be found in country’s 
internal factors, a conclusion preordained by the premise. indeed, 
since, in this view, democracy and neoliberal capitalism are the two 
faces of the same coin, the notion that neoliberalism may be one 
such hurdle is essentially meaningless. moreover, since neoliberal-
ism is bound up with globalization, there is a clear reluctance at 
stressing the negative role of external factors, such as the agendas 
of multilateral organizations or the strategic operations of west-
ern powers.1 By looking at a single historical process, such as the 
reform of the state, in which competing forces representative of 
democratization and neoliberalism can be shown to be at work, 
1 The role of china in defeating the promotion of democracy, human rights and 
good governance is one exception in the more recent literature — for no obvious rea-
son other than the fact that china is not a western power, since the same behaviour, 
or even worse, is observable in american or french foreign policy for instance. 
Public institutions and the Paradox of liberal democracy
50
this ‘internal/external factors’ debate can be displaced by a more 
fruitful comparison. for in studying the effects of two divergent 
reform agendas of the state, we are comparing effective processes, 
not biased conjectures.  
on this score, it is obviously fair to say that in the poorer coun-
tries of the South, the democratic reform of the state was meant to 
strengthen it, not weaken it. The intention was that the overhauled 
strength of a reformed state could be put to work on development, 
on the basis of participation from all classes of society, instead of 
being used and misused by the small cliques that profited from au-
thoritarian rule. and it is equally fair to say that neoliberal reform, 
on the other hand, sought to weaken the state and let competition in 
the marketplace determine winners and losers, with no demonstrated 
concern for the society that people form under a state. The compar-
isons between niger and india, and that between west Bengal and 
Gujarat within india, reveal that in this struggle, neoliberalism has 
tended to gain the upper hand, and it is here that the study shows 
that we may put the stress on internal factors. if democracy was es-
sentially promoted by internal forces, and neoliberalism by external 
ones, the relative defeat of democracy should primarily be explained 
by failings from the (internal) forces that supported it. in this study, 
such failings have been analyzed through a schema derived from Bo-
livian history, and a longer study could delve into the living details of 
how the schema worked in each case, what caused success, and what 
prompted failure. 
another major conclusion of the study indicates that neoliberal 
reform especially weakened the weaker — niger rather than india 
and, within india, west Bengal rather than Gujarat. and finally, given 
that democratic reform is in fact the antagonist of neoliberal reform 
when it comes to the state and to development, one may conjecture 
that only by embracing it could countries that have been subjected to 
the neoliberal regimen transcend their predicament. further research 
in both reform agendas — their social conditions, political implica-
tions and economic parameters — is however needed to effectively 
understand both the theory and the practice of democratic reform. 
Such understanding, i believe, is much needed.
finally, it is also rewarding to interpret these case studies 
through rodrik’s (2000) political-economic trilemma, where it is 
impossible to have at the same time international economic integra-
tion (by way of economic liberalism), mass politics (democracy)2 
2 rodrik’s ‘mass politics’ is defined in almost exactly the way i would define 
my usage of ‘democracy’ throughout this essay: ‘i use the term mass politics,’ 
Abdourahmane Idrissa
51
and a sovereign nation-state. one can have two of these elements 
together, rodrik argues, but not all three. investment in globaliza-
tion (i.e., that which rodrik calls international economic integra-
tion) and the nation-state sacrifices democracy; to hold on democ-
racy and the nation-state, what would tend to forego globalization; 
and in order to combine democracy and globalization, the nation-
state should lose its sovereignty, i.e., its essence. rodrik stresses 
that the underlying reasons for this triple bind are not obvious, 
but it is easy to see how the stories of Bolivia, niger, Gujarat and 
west Bengal enact in various ways the strictures of the trilemma. 
all of these entities want to combine globalization, democracy 
and sovereignty, but the tensions created by the incompatibilities 
between these three orientations taken together lead in effect to 
somewhat incongruous outcomes. Thus for instance, niger’s hes-
itant dance of je t’aime, moi non plus (‘i love you, me neither’) 
with a market giant that its public wishes to subdue, that its state 
wishes to use to buttress its financial sovereignty, and which its 
entrepreneurs view as a ticket into global markets. one can also 
see that Gujarat under modi has solved the trilemma by opting 
for a combination of the nation-state and market opening against 
democracy, while west Bengal’s muddle comes from ideological 
positions where it is more difficult to make such a definite choice. 
reflecting on rodrik’s trilemma, nayyar (2015) problematizes it 
however by showing that while it is helpful in highlighting policy 
conflicts — as in the case studies for this essay — its rigid ‘either/
or’ cast does not allow us to capture the dialectical complexity of 
the relationships between democracy, the nation-state and globali-
zation. in nayyar’s perspective, countries can engage in all three 
pursuits without having to make a trade-off, because it is only in 
the abstract that these pursuits represent a single unique point: in 
reality, they represent a range and a continuum, so much so that 
it is ‘possible to have more of two and less of the third’ (nayyar, 
2015: 49). in this context, we are faced with dialectical tensions 
between the three nodes, rather than the simple binary choice sug-
gested by rodrik. These tensions are most visible in the relation-
ship between democracy and globalization (i.e., what i call here 
‘the second wave of economic liberalism’) in the national context. 
Thus, for instance, while the triumph of markets forces (and their 
he writes, ‘to refer to political systems where: a) the franchise is unrestricted, b) 
there is a high degree of political mobilization and c) political institutions are re-
sponsive to mobilized groups’ (‘how far will international economic integration 
Go?’, 2000: 180).  
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unequal distribution of incomes and assets) entails a discomfiture 
of democracy (and its equal distribution of votes) — something 
most visible in the case of Gujarat — it by no means spell the end 
of democratic politics. within the political economy of a nation (or 
a sub-national unit such as Gujarat and west Bengal), the market 
and democracy organize systems of inclusion and exclusion based 
on differentials of purchasing and voting powers: while these sys-
tems contradict each other in their inner logics (market forces are 
accountable to money elite, while political forces are accountable 
to majority voters), they may also reinforce each other (vote with-
out financial power has, in practice, little staying power in politics 
conducted beyond the electoral moment). 
one flaw in nayyar’s analysis resides in the fact that he effec-
tively reduces democracy to elections and government account-
ability, while this essay proposes that it results from a multi-class 
consensus on the ability of the state to accommodate the rights 
and interests of all citizens. That is, democracy is a collective way 
to transcend social-political contradictions that is grounded in the 
powers of the state. in other words, what is claimed here is that 
both rodrik’s trilemma and nayyar’s dialectical tension are rooted 
in a more basic dilemma or tension, that which exists between 
classes and politically significant groups that would stand to ben-
efit more or less from the second wave of economic liberalization. 
although i have based my analysis on class, this does not mean 
that there is a class-determinism in that regard, i.e., all elite classes 
are not necessarily preordained to gain from neoliberal reforms — 
as the Gujarat story might intimate — and all popular classes are 
not by definition political fatalities in such a process, even though 
that is empirically more often the case than not. moreover, motiva-
tions are not always of one single nature. elite classes may tend to 
ally with market giants not only for their own profit, but also be-
cause they find in this a greater good. That is one conclusion that 
may be drawn from the niger story: reaching a deal with areva 
that increases state revenue assures the position and strengthens 
the legitimacy of the élite. in this instance élite, motivations coin-
cide with the collective good. however, even when there is such a 
coincidence, the élite classes can exclude the popular classes from 
the political process surrounding the management and utilization 
of revenues, when there is no multi-class consensus on the op-
eration of state institutions. more generally, democracy is not so 
much a point in a trilemma or a node in a dialectical relationship, 
as one result of the political algorithm — other results being élite 
authoritarianism or chronic instability — that would determine 
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the power with which the state3 would confront large-scale politi-
cal-economic events, such as the second wave of economic liberal-
ism and uphold the relevance of the political society it serves in the 
international political economy.
3 one hypothesis that is implicit in this essay is that the stronger the multi-class 
consensus, the stronger the power of the state system it supports. This hypothesis 
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